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ABSTRACT PAGE
Unconscious thought has long been theorized to play an important role in the creative
process. Although this relationship has been extensively researched, the specific pathways
leading from unconscious cognitive processes to useful creative output are still poorly
understood. Thrash and Elliot (2003) have elaborated on inspiration as a psychological
construct. The current study tests a mediational model in which inspiration mediates the
relationship between unconscious thought and creative output using four conditions
(control, conscious thought, 1-back, and 2-back). Preliminary analyses indicated a failure
of the manipulation to influence unconscious thought, inspiration, or creativity. Further
analyses supported the pattern of results predicted by the mediational model, such that
attributions of an idea to unconscious thought predicted inspiration at the moment of
getting an idea, which in turn predicted self-ratings of creativity of the completed story.
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A mediational model o f the creative process
Historically, methodological constraints have limited research regarding the
creative process to the description o f cognitions present during menial creativity tasks.
Although previous research has provided useful insight into cognitive processes involved
in creativity, it has done little to characterize the specific pathways that lead from creative
cognitions to tangible creative products. These pathways, largely unconscious and
difficult to report, have guided researchers and theorists toward the goal o f establishing a
link between unconscious thought processes and creativity (Bowden & Jung Beeman,
1998; Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2005; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Koestler, 1964;
Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993).
Results from research by Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2006) supported this link.
However, interpretations o f these results are limited by the simplicity o f the creativity
tasks presented. These tasks, primarily focused on measures of divergent thinking or
novel associations, are not o f sufficient complexity to adequately describe the creative
process. Although they do assess certain cognitions necessary for creativity, they do not
assess or characterize the act o f creation itself (i.e., writing a story, creating a work of art,
developing a new scientific theory). As such, they assess only a very limited subset o f the
cognitive processes involved in creativity. Thus, these results paint an incomplete picture
of the relationship between unconscious thought and the creative process and provide a
limited description o f the progression from cognition to actualized creative output. The
present study seeks to establish a specific pathway between unconscious processes and
creative output.
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Creativity
Creativity is the act o f bringing into being something original and meaningful.
The hallmarks o f creative output are that it be useful, original, meaningful, and
appropriate to the context in which it will be applied. Creativity is characterized as the
generation of original ideas that transcend standard rules, relationships, norms and
patterns {Oxford English Dictionary; 1989). Researchers have searched for a way to
define the creative personality for decades, from seeking to identify personality traits
associated with creative behavior to establishing the cognitive processes mediating
creativity (Baer & Oldman, 2006; Kelly, 2006; Simonton, 1999; Weisberg, 2006;
Wolfradt & Pretz, 2001). Simonton (1999) performed a meta-analysis o f the literature
regarding creativity and personality and identified six clusters o f findings. High levels of
creativity are associated with intelligence, a cognitive style open to divergent ideas,
openness to new experiences, a motivation to create, unusual behavior, lack o f social
interest, and schizophrenia-related symptomatology.
Similarly, W ycoff and Pryor (2003) showed that creative individuals exhibited a
higher need for cognition and more use o f humor, which they interpreted as the tendency
for creative individuals to reffame threatening information and to seek out cognitively
complex stimuli. Other studies have shown that creative behavior is unrelated to
neuroticism (Martindale & Dailey, 1996), and that openness to experience and
extraversion positively predict creative hobbies, creatively rated college majors, and peeror expert-rated creative performance (Wolfradt & Pretz, 2001).
Indeed, after studying the relationship between personality traits and creative
behavior, Wolfradt and Pretz (2001) identified openness as the only personality trait to
predict creativity across fields o f art, science, and a variety o f hobbies. The researchers
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suggested that this result may have indicated a high degree o f domain specificity
regarding creativity, with openness serving as a common underlying trait that acts as a
catalyst for individuals to excel in their chosen domain because o f their acceptance of
new ideas. Kelly (2006) found that, in addition to openness, extraversion was also a
significant predictor o f creativity. This finding is consistent with some previous research
(Wolfradt & Pretz, 2001), although not as common a finding as the relationship between
openness and creativity. Kelly (2006) interpreted this relationship between extraversion
and creativity as a by-product o f the equally strong relationship between extraversion and
tolerance, which she defined as a general attitudinal quality of openness to others’ ideas
and flexibility in thinking when comparing ideas. This interpretation is consistent with
previous research showing that creativity was related to an increased ability to tolerate
ambiguity (Sternberg, 1995). A heightened ability to tolerate ambiguity could help
creative individuals evaluate new ideas, making them more likely to allow themselves to
experience the uncertainty that occurs when challenging their own previously held ideas
and adapting them to fit with new information.
Recent research has used new technology in neuroscience to identify specific
structures and patterns of activation that underlie the creative process. Howard-Jones and
colleagues (2005) used fMRI to identify activations o f semantic divergence during a
creative story generation task. During the creativity task, participants were required to
incorporate three unrelated words into a story. In the uncreative condition, participants
generated a story for three words that were obviously related to a single experience.
When participants were engaged in creative, as opposed to uncreative, activities, they
demonstrated increased bilateral activity in the medial frontal gyri and left anterior
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cingulated cortex. The researchers suggested that this increased activation may be
explained by the increased working load of creating novel associations, or by increased
demands of episodic memory retrieval. In addition, creative tasks activated parts of the
visual cortex, possibly indicating increased use o f visual imagery when completing an
explicitly creative task.
Battacharya and Petsche (2005) observed significantly different cortical
functioning in artists versus non-artists during a sketching task. Specifically, frontal
cortical regions showed dominant activity in the right hemisphere o f artists, but not non
artists, possibly indicating extensive top-down processing and visual imagery during an
artistic task. Grabner and colleagues (2007) showed similar right hemispheric activations
for participant-generated ideas that were self-rated as “more original.” These studies
show reliable brain activations during the creative process, and are a useful complement
to cognitive and personality research in establishing that process as a distinct
phenomenon.
Creativity and Unconscious Thought
The hypothesized relationship between unconscious thought and creativity has
been the subject o f extensive speculation and, more recently, empirical study
(Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2005; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Kris, 1952; Lubart & Getz,
1997; Wallas, 1926). Ideas about the exact nature o f the relationship have evolved from a
focus on the psychodynamic unconscious to include the cognitive processes involved in
unconscious thought.
One o f the earliest to attempt a theory o f creative thought was Wallas (1926), who
proposed a four-stage process composed of preparation, incubation, illumination, and
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verification. The preparation stage takes place consciously and refers to the process of
taking in adequate information regarding the specific area o f creativity targeted. The
incubation stage is a period of time in which the individual disengages from the creative
process or objective. The illumination stage follows, and is characterized by an idea
bursting into consciousness, otherwise known as the “Aha!” moment. The verification
stage takes place consciously as well, and is characterized by the actualization or
application of the idea resulting from the thought process (Wallas, 1926). O f particular
interest here is the incubation stage, which implies an active process that takes places
while attention is directed away from the information taken in during preparation, and is
directly followed by an illumination event consisting o f a creative idea. Wallas’s
influential theory has directed creativity research for the past century, with particular
attention paid to characterizing the processes that take place during the largely
unconscious incubation stage.
Primary Process Thinking. Early references to the role o f the unconscious in the
creative process emerged from the psychodynamic theories o f Freud and Kris. Freud
(1958) outlined primitive thinking. Also termed primary process thinking (Russ, 2001),
these thought processes occur early in the developmental process. Primary process
thinking is primal, present at birth, and possesses strongly associated affective
components (Freud, 1966; Russ, 2001). As such, it operates independently of logical,
lexical thinking processes, which develop later and are rooted in language-based
mechanisms. This primitive thinking is characterized by the use o f non-verbal imagery
and considerable flexibility. Primary process thinking can be likened to the type of
thinking present in dreams, which is often illogical, free o f time/space orientation, and
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affect-laden (Russ, 2001). These definitions o f primary process thinking imply two basic
components: affective and cognitive (Russ, 2001). Holt (1977) proposed two types of
properties that illustrate these components. Formal properties contain loose associations
and condensed images, thus resembling the cognitive component proposed by Russ
(2001). Content properties include affect-laden, aggressive, libidinal content that
represents both the cognitive and affective components o f primary process thinking.
Psychoanalytic theory has characterized primary process as possessing a property
called mobility of cathexis, meaning that the energy surrounding and underpinning ideas
and images is fluid and easily displaced. As such, this energy is not constricted to a
specific idea or concept. Instead, it is freely circulating and promotes a wide scope of
flexibly focused attention. This characteristic o f primary process thinking facilitates a
psychological state that allows interchangeable associations between all ideas, concepts,
and images present in the mind. Indeed, Martindale (1989) posited that the freely
associative nature o f primary process thinking increases the likelihood o f discovering
novel combinations of concepts. This property o f primary process thinking is a necessary
component of creativity, where ideas and concepts are in part defined by the novelty of
the associations underpinning them.
Kris (1952) relied heavily on primary process thinking in his theory o f regression
in the service of the ego. This theory o f the origins of creativity elaborated on Freud’s
description o f primary process thinking, focusing on the importance o f controlling
primary process thought and integrating it with conscious, secondary processes. Kris
asserted that creative individuals possess strong egos that are not easily threatened by the
affect-laden, primitive, often aggressive desires o f the unconscious (Kris, 1952). Thus,
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creative individuals are able to learn to harness and control their primary process thinking
(Kris, 1952; Russ, 2001). These individuals can then regress to primary process modes of
thought in a controlled fashion, returning to more rational thought processes as they
desire. The ability to engage in controlled alternation between two modes o f thought
allows creative persons to evaluate the loose, primitive, affective associations formed
during primary process thinking in a more logical context. The result o f controlled
regression is a pathway for the use of unconscious and unusual associations in logically
evaluated creative outputs (Kris, 1952). Kris further postulated that control is the
distinguishing factor between creative individuals and those individuals with disordered
thought and psychopathology, who display similar patterns o f regression in an
uncontrolled manner.
Unconscious Thought. With the advent o f the cognitive revolution, theories of
unconscious influences on creativity moved from describing the psychodynamic
unconscious to uncovering specific cognitive processes involved in creativity.
Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2004) began researching unconscious processes in decision
making and creativity tasks and showed that unconscious processes may be superior to
conscious processes under certain conditions. Their Unconscious Thought Theory
outlines two modes o f thought: conscious and unconscious. Dijksterhuis and Nordgren
(2006) have proposed that these modes of thought are qualitatively different. As such,
they are applicable to different circumstances.
Conscious thought is defined as cognitive or affective thought processes that
occur with conscious attention directed at a specific object or task (Dijksterhuis &
Nordgren, 2006). Unconscious thought processes, while still object- and task-relevant,
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take place while conscious attention is being focused in another direction. Both modes o f
thought contain cognitive and affective aspects, but the key difference between the two
modes is attention. Although the two processes are relatively independent, they
continually function together. Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) outlined several key
differences between conscious and unconscious thought that are relevant to the creative
process.
Consciousness is generally constrained to completing one task at a time because
of its relatively low processing capacity. Miller (1956) determined that the storage
capacity of consciousness is about seven items. Conscious thought can process between
10 and 60 bits per second according to some researchers. This processing capacity
represents only a small fraction o f the total processing capacity that is possible with the
entire human system. Wilson and Schooler (1991) showed that conscious thought,
because o f its highly limited capacity, led people to focus on a limited subset o f attributes
to the detriment o f other relevant attributes. In their studies, participants evaluated and
rated different categories o f objects. Those participants instructed to carefully analyze the
objects made less accurate evaluations than the participants who were merely instructed
to casually evaluate the objects without directed thought or effort.
Dijksterhuis (2004) provided further evidence for the negative impact o f limited
processing capacity when he presented participants with a large amount information
about four apartments and asked them to pick the best one. He divided participants into
two groups: a conscious thought group and an unconscious thought group. In the
conscious thought group, participants were instructed to carefully analyze the information
presented. In the unconscious thought group, participants completed a distraction task
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which prevented them from consciously focusing attention on the information presented.
Dijksterhuis asserted that this distraction task paradigm forced participants to engage in
unconscious thought for a period o f time, during which unconscious cognitive processes
continued to evaluate the information while attention was directed elsewhere. In line with
the capacity principle, participants in the conscious thought group reported less holistic
judgments than participants in the unconscious thought group. Additionally, unconscious
thinkers chose the objectively superior apartment more often than both conscious thinkers
and the immediate choice control condition. The capacity principle has implications for
the creative process in addition to decision making processes. Specifically, low
processing capacity could impede the formation o f novel associations between
tangentially related information that characterizes creative output.
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) posited that unconscious thought operates
aschematically. As such, it is not constrained by an already existing, highly structured,
deeply entrenched schema. Rather, it is better at discovering a structure from information
that is already present. Consciousness is guided by schemas and expectancies. As such, it
generally seeks to incorporate information into existing patterns and previously held
expectancies. Sloman (1991) outlined two distinct reasoning processes that mirror the
two modes of thought in Dijksterhuis’ model. He stated that conscious, strategic thought
processes possess an inherent hierarchical structure that automatic reasoning processes do
not. Dijksterhius and colleagues suggested that the limited processing capacity of
consciousness directly leads to more schema use. Indeed, using the same conscious
versus unconscious thought paradigm, they showed that conscious thinkers more easily
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resorted to the use o f racial stereotypes than unconscious thinkers when evaluating a new
person (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006).
In contrast, unconscious thought is a slower process that integrates larger amounts
o f information into a more objective judgment without excessive limitation by existing
organizational frameworks. Dijksterhuis (2004) further showed that, when provided with
a consciously processed goal, unconscious thought can lead to enhanced memory with
better organized categories. In fact, participants engaging in unconscious thought
organized information about a potential roommate into logical clusters (i.e., intelligent
behavior, extraverted behavior) without being informed o f the clusters in advance.
Dijksterhuis (2004) used these findings to determine that unconscious thought is an
active, goal directed process that cannot be explained by mere set shifting or forgetting.
Instead, it involves more consistent categorization o f information into emergent
categories that result in changes in the mental representations o f objects (Dijksterhuis &
Nordgren, 2006).
This difference also has implications for the creative process. To the degree that
unconscious thought provides a clearer, more comprehensive mental representation of
information and objects, it could result in ideas that are not only novel but creatively
useful as well. Conversely, to the degree that conscious thought provides representations
that only fit into existing, rigidly held schemas, it could significantly inhibit novel,
creative ideas.
The weighting principle states that the unconscious naturally weights information
about various attributes o f an object based on their relative importance. Wilson and
Schooler (1991) argued that conscious thought disrupts this naturally occurring process
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and results in sub-optimal weighting. Wilson and colleagues showed that decisions made
by conscious thinkers were often inconsistent and less satisfying over time, strongly
adhered to, and wrong (Dijksterhuis & Van Olden, 2006; Wilson, Lisle, Schooler,
Hodges, Klaaren, & LeFleur, 1993). Wilson et al. (1993) concluded that conscious
thought forces people to place more weight on attributes that are easily accessible and
verbalized while ignoring attributes that are more abstract. Dijksterhuis suggested that
deliberation may actually be detrimental in the absence of a limited set o f attributes that
require a certain weighting. In terms o f creativity, the weighting o f a limited number of
easily accessible, highly semantic attributes would inhibit the formation o f novel
associations using additional, more abstract and affective attributes.
Perhaps most relevant to the creative process, conscious thought processes are
generally convergent whereas unconscious thought processes are divergent. As a result of
the schema-focused, capacity constrained nature o f consciousness, it is pressured to
search for and categorize information in a way that will converge upon a single concept,
idea, or category. Unconscious thought, as a result of its large processing capacity that
remains unbound by existing rules or schemas, is more divergent. This principle speaks
specifically to the role o f incubation in creativity. The idea that the unconscious is active
even without direct attention has been a proposed component of creativity since Wallas
(1926) theorized about the creative process. Indeed, many creative individuals describe a
process in which their most creative ideas or solutions to problems occur at times when
they are not actively thinking about the task or problem. This certainly characterizes
unconscious thought as an active process that, perhaps through incubation, is able to
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process information in such a way that novel associations are formed using a larger pool
of knowledge.
Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) showed that unconscious thinkers produced more
creative and divergent uses o f a brick, and more divergent responses to a listing task.
Although these studies address one facet o f creativity, they provide evidence for the
superiority o f unconscious thought in creativity. Dijksterhuis’ and Nordgren’s (2006)
theory o f unconscious thought provides a useful framework from which to study the
effects of different modes of thought on creativity. Although it outlines many reasons for
the superiority o f unconscious thought in creative tasks, results o f research thus far have
established the link using tasks that assess only a very limited number o f simple creativity
tasks. As such, these results do little to elucidate what takes place during unconscious
thought that specifically facilitates more creative output. It is possible that other cognitive
processes linked to creativity could help to provide a more detailed explanation
qualifying the relationship between unconscious thought and creativity.
Insight
Insight is defined as an unexpected solution to a problem that appears after an
impasse, and has long been described as possessing qualities that are distinct from
language and based in unconscious processes (Bowden & Jung Beeman, 1998; Koestler,
1964; Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993; Wallas, 1926). Evidence for these processes
comes from a variety o f sources, most notably from anecdotal reports by creative
individuals and laboratory scientists, who recall solutions appearing suddenly after
periods o f distraction or wordless thought. Further information comes from experimental
studies by Kaplan and Simon (1990), who reported that individuals successfully solving
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insight problems were unable to report critical steps in the problem solving process,
primarily the sudden reorganizations o f information that seem to precede the appearance
o f a solution.
Insight problems have been extensively used in the study of both creativity and
inspiration. An insight problem contains three necessary properties: it is within the
competence of an average subject, it has a high probability of leading to an impasse, and
has a high probability o f leading to a sudden appearance o f a solution after periods of
sustained effort or distraction (Bowden, Jung Beeman, & Fleck, 2005; Schooler, Ohlsson,
& Brooks, 1993). Although these problems have been useful in establishing a cursory
account o f processes involved in insight, the results o f studies comparing insight and non
insight problems should be interpreted with caution. Insight problems can be solved using
processes unrelated to insight. The insights experienced during insight problem solving
are not inherent components o f the problem itself, but rather result from specific types of
thought patterns that may or may not be applied to the problem.
Early research into the cognitive mechanisms active during insight problems
solving suggested the importance o f unconscious thought in arriving at solutions. More
recent research has characterized these unconscious processes as the result o f spreading
activation (Ohlsson, 1992; Schooler et al., 1993). Ohlsson (1992) proposed a model
suggesting that information not directly related to an insight problem is activated in
subawareness. This activation accumulates until it reaches a threshold of consciousness.
During the accumulation phase, which takes place unconsciously or below the threshold
of awareness, mental representations of a problem or object change. With each change in
the representation comes a corresponding spreading activation down a new pathway
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away from the activation o f the original information (Schooler et al., 1993). In this way,
more remote information is activated to form a larger base o f information in the
unconscious. This process may directly facilitate the reorganizations and novel
associations responsible for both insight and creativity. As such, it is qualitatively
different from the analytical processes that are used during the conscious contemplation
o f a problem.
Indeed, Kounios and colleagues (2006) have used imaging techniques to show
qualitative differences in brain activation during self-reported insight experiences when
solving insight problems. Specifically, activity preceding the introduction o f the problem
predicted whether or not participants would solve the problem correctly. Further, both
EEG and fMRI data showed increased activity in medial frontal and temporal areas
before exposure to correctly solved problems (Kounios, et al., 2006). The authors
suggested that this pattern o f activation indicated preparation to strongly activate
prepotent candidate solutions, and to prepare attention to switch to non-prepotent
' solutions if necessary. In this way, insight preparation is able to prepare individuals to not
unduly discount weak or distant solutions characterized by remote associations, a process
that is essential in creativity tasks.
Seger, Glover, and Gabrieli (2000) used fMRI to study differential activation in
cortical structures during a novel word generation task. Participants completed tasks
requiring the generation o f verbs that were either closely or distantly related to a given
noun. Closely associated semantic items showed activation in the left inferior frontal lobe
and right cerebellum. Distant associations between nouns and verbs produced identical
activation in the left inferior frontal lobe and additional activations in the right prefrontal
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cortex, left middle frontal gyrus, and bilateral activation in the cerebellum. The left
inferior prefrontal cortex has been implicated in selection o f items based on semantic
properties. Interestingly, this activation remained unchanged during the generation o f
distant associations, with new areas being recruited to complete the task. The pattern
observed in the generation of distant associations suggests that perhaps the function of
the inferior prefrontal cortex is more important for identifying close semantic
relationships, with additional areas needed to form more distant associations (Seger,
Glover, & Gabrieli, 2000). The frontal gyrus and cerebellum have both been implicated
in searching for correct responses. To the degree that searching for novel associations is
more effortful, researchers asserted that activations in these areas during generation of
distant associations is not surprising.
The right prefrontal cortex has been similarly implicated in insight processes
central to the concept o f inspiration. Goel and Vartanian (2005) identified differential
activation between lateral and vertical set shifts in an insight task. Specifically, increased
right prefrontal cortex activation was observed in lateral, but not vertical, set shifts.
Further, a hypothesis generation task for solutions to the match problem showed
significant activation in the left dorsolateral and right ventrolateral prefrontal cortices,
indicating that both lateral and vertical set shifts are involved in the generation process.
Additionally, comparisons o f successfully versus unsuccessfully completed insight
problems showed right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and left middle frontal gyrus
activation. This pattern o f activation indicates processes beyond that of mere insight,
which is associated with the right hippocampus (Goel & Vartanian, 2005, Luo & Niki,
2003). Thus, activations observed during lateral set shifts in insight problem solving
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suggest additional processes that remain unexplained by activities observed in previous
research on insight (Luo & Niki, 2003). It is possible that these additional activations
could correspond with certain processes involved in inspiration, a link that has yet to be
studied.
Interestingly, the patterns of right hemispheric activation seen in insight problem
solving are similar to those found in the previously discussed study o f neural processes in
professional artists. These activations, corresponding largely with hard-to-verbalize,
unconscious thought processes, suggest a similar mechanism underlying insight and
creativity.
Inspiration
Thrash and Elliot (2003) have characterized inspiration as composed o f three core
characteristics: transcendence, evocation, and approach motivation. Transcendence is
one’s awareness that a higher level o f output can be achieved, and is characterized as
integral in the processes o f illumination and insight (Thrash & Elliot, 2003). Evocation
refers to the tendency o f inspiration to be experienced as an unwilled and evoked event.
Inspiration is an experience attributed to a source other than the self, for which the self
cannot take responsibility. Finally, inspiration is partially composed of an approach
motivation, which is the force that compels individuals to transmit their inspired idea
outward to others. Interestingly, inspiration is distinguishable from the approachmotivated positive affective state, which exhibits similar levels o f approach motivation,
but lower levels o f transcendence and evocation.
Researchers have suggested that inspiration serves the important function of
transmitting or actualizing ideas or visions (Thrash & Elliot, 2003). The proposed
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relationships between transcendence, illumination, and insight are o f particular relevance
here. After insight forces an idea into consciousness, the resulting illumination triggers
inspiration which provides a pressure to transmit that idea outward and to actualize the
idea into a transmittable form. Thus, it seems that inspiration could play an important role
in the creative process by pressing individuals to transform a novel, original, creative idea
into a product that can be shared and useful. Inspiration has been largely ignored both in
general psychological research and in the creativity literature.
These links within the construct of inspiration suggest a direct role for inspiration
in the unconscious processes leading to creative output. More specifically, the necessity
of the transcendence component o f inspiration in insight suggests that inspiration could
play a similar role in creativity. Taken together, it is reasonable to propose a link between
unconscious processes, inspiration, and the creative process. More specifically,
inspiration could help describe the established, yet poorly understood, relationship
between unconscious thought and creativity.
Thrash and Elliot (2003) established a link between inventors’ self-rated
inspiration and their number of registered patents. Additionally, the number o f patents
was significantly related to the self-reported frequency of inspiration in patent holders.
Furthermore, the study showed that patent holders reported experiencing inspiration more
frequently and more intensely than a control group (Thrash & Elliot, 2003). Further
support for the link between inspiration and creativity comes from several studies by
Thrash and colleagues (manuscript in progress). Inspiration predicted peer-rated
creativity in both scientific- and poetry-writing tasks when controlling for self-rated
effort. A third study related self-reports o f inspiration, effort, and positive affect (PA)
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while writing to the creativity o f completed stories as rated by English majors and
American Studies graduate students. Creativity ratings were significantly positively
correlated with both inspiration and PA, but not effort. A regression analysis revealed
that only inspiration uniquely predicted ratings of creativity, p = 0.26, p<0.01.
This study also revealed interesting patterns in self-attributions o f thought
processes involved in the generation o f ideas for the story writing process. In a regression
analysis, effort and PA positively predicted the attribution o f one’s ideas to conscious
thought, whereas inspiration negatively predicted conscious thought attributions. Another
regression showed that self-rated inspiration and PA positively predicted unconscious
thought, whereas effort negatively predicted unconscious thought. These findings provide
evidence o f an extra step in the causal chain of the creative process. Namely, unconscious
thought could make an individual more likely to experience inspiration and to produce
output that is rated as more creative by themselves and others.
Based on the research outlined above, I hypothesized a mediational model of
creativity. Specifically, I hypothesize that unconscious thought, when compared to
conscious thought, would produce higher self-rated and peer-rated creativity o f a
completed story writing task. I further posited that this process would be mediated by
inspiration while generating an idea and completing the story-writing task. I tested this
hypothesis by applying Dijksterhuis and colleagues’ (2006) distraction task paradigm to a
story writing task in which participants complete a previously viewed story immediately
or after engaging in either conscious or unconscious thought.
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Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty-two undergraduates (64 females; mean age = 18.78, SD = 0.95)
from the College of William and Mary participated in the experiment. They were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions: a control condition (n = 31), a conscious
thought condition (n = 32), a 1-back unconscious thought condition (n = 27), and a 2back unconscious thought condition (n = 31). All participants provided informed consent
prior to completion o f the experiment and were granted course credit in exchange for
participation. One participant in the 2-back unconscious condition was dropped due to a
programming malfunction that interrupted the distraction task.
Procedure
Participants completed one hour-long experimental session. All instructions and
stimuli were administered using a Dell computer and MediaLab ® software.
Participants completed a battery o f initial measures assessing self-reports o f
writing experience and ability, personality traits, trait-level affect, and thinking style.
After the initial questionnaires, participants completed practice 1-back and 2-back tasks.
Following Dijksterhuis and Meurs’ (2006) paradigm, n-back tasks were used to
manipulate conscious versus unconscious modes of thought. An n-back task is a memory
task in which participants are presented with a series of one-digit numbers one at a time.
They are then asked if the presented digit is a “match” or “no match” to the digit that
appears n digits before it (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; Jonides, Schumacher, Smith,
Lauber, Awh, et al., 1997). For the 1-back task, participants were asked whether or not
the presented digit matched the one that came before it (i.e., one digit back). For the 2-
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back task, participants were asked whether or not the presented digit matched the one that
came two before it (i.e., two digits back; see Appendix 1 for the full description of n-back
tasks as viewed by participants).
Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) suggested that the cognitive resources needed to
complete these tasks fully occupy conscious attention, thereby preventing conscious,
focused thought. They further argued that this prevention o f conscious thought actually
promotes unconscious thought processes, a theory that has been supported by their
findings in several studies o f decision making and simple creative processes. Practice nback sessions o f both 1- and 2-back tasks were included in all conditions to reduce the
likelihood that unfamiliarity with the task during the actual unconscious thought period
could cause frustration in the unconscious thought conditions. These practice sessions
provided participants with feedback after every response and all participants were given
the option to repeat each practice session until they understood the task.
Participants were introduced to the story writing task after completion of the
practice 1- and 2-back tasks. They first viewed instructions which informed them that
they would have 30 seconds to read the first few sentences o f a story (see Appendix 2),
after which they would have seven minutes to complete the story. Participants were
provided with the beginning sentences o f the story in an effort to standardize the content
of the completed stories, thus making it easier to compare the creativity of the stories. In
the control condition, participants were given seven minutes to complete the story
immediately following their initial viewing of the first sentences o f the story. In the
conscious thought condition, participants were informed that they should take three
minutes to think about and plan their story before writing. They were then shown a blank
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white screen for three minutes, after which they were given seven minutes to complete
the story.
In the 1-back unconscious thought condition, participants completed a threeminute version o f the 1-back task that they practiced earlier in the study, while
participants in the 2-back unconscious thought condition completed a three-minute
version of the 2-back task they had practiced earlier in the study. The n-back tasks were
created to contain evenly distributed ratios of one match for every five non-matches
throughout the entire task. This ratio corresponded with approximately one match for
every five stimuli in the 1- and 2-back tasks. Within each subset o f five stimuli, the
location o f the match was allowed to vary randomly. Each digit in the n-back tasks was
presented in the center o f the computer screen for two seconds. Participants were then
presented with a screen containing the options “Match” or “No Match,” and were asked
to respond within five seconds o f viewing the digit. Previous studies have used various nback distraction tasks when manipulating conscious and unconscious thought in both
decision making and creativity tasks (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; Jonides, Schumacher,
Smith, Lauber, Awh, et al., 1997).
The decision to include both a 1- and 2-back task condition was made for multiple
reasons. First, although the 2-back task has been used as a distraction task in previous
research, the difficulty o f the task is likely to cause frustration in some participants. The
1-back task was significantly less taxing during pilot sessions and was included to
investigate potentially differential effects o f the distraction tasks on participants’ selfrated affect. Second, the 1-back task may not completely prevent conscious thought
during the distraction period because it requires less cognitive resources, and may instead
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promote only a partial blockage o f conscious thought. The inclusion o f this task allows a
comparison o f partially obscured conscious thought with a task that completely obscures
conscious thought (the 2-back task). After these respective distraction tasks, participants
in both the 1-back and 2-back conditions were given seven minutes to complete their
stories.
After the story writing task, participants completed questionnaires assessing affect
at various points during the story writing task, reports o f idea modality, attribution, and
self-ratings o f inspiration, creativity, and effort in generating a story idea and writing the
story, and self-appraisal o f the idea and o f the finished story.
Measures
Writing Experience. Participants first completed a 6-item self-report assessment
o f experience and perceived competence. Three items pertained to writing in general and
three items addressed the writing of fictional stories specifically. Participants responded
to all six items using a Likert scale ranging from one (Not at all experienced) to seven
(Extremely experienced). Sample items include “How experienced are you with writing?”
NEO-FFI. The NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992) is
a 60-item personality assessment providing measures o f five established domains:
extroversion (E), neuroticism (N), agreeableness (A), openness to experience (O), and
conscientiousness (C). Six additional items from the NEO-Personality Inventory Revised
Openness-Aesthetic sub-factor (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) were included in this
study as they were particularly relevant to the study o f creativity. Participants responded
to the degree to which the items accurately described them using a five-point Likert scale
(\=Strongly disagree, 5-Strongly agree).

23
Affect. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988) was developed to assess two dominant and relatively independent
dimensions of affect. We used to the PANAS to assess trait level positive affect (PA; 10
items) and negative affect (NA; 10 items) at the beginning o f the experimental session.
Additionally, the PANAS was completed three times after the story writing task in order
to assess state-level positive and negative affect at the time o f getting an idea for a story,
while writing the story, and at the end of the experimental session. Participants responded
to the degree to which the items described what they were feeling at the specified time
using a five-point Likert scale (1=Very slightly, 5=Extremely).
Idea modality. All participants completed an 18-item measure o f modality twice
after the story writing task: once regarding the modality in which the central idea
appeared (visual, auditory, specific words, scents, phrases to be used, etc.) and again
regarding the degree to which each item played a role in the story writing process.
Participants responded to the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with each
modality using a seven-point Likert scale (l-Strongly disagree, l=Strongly agree).
Idea and story appraisal. Participants completed a 27-item measure twice after
the story completion task: once as an appraisal o f their idea and again as an appraisal of
their completed story. Both measures used a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 {strongly
agree). Six items from this scale were used to compute a measure o f creativity of the
story idea or of the completed story. This measure consisted o f a summation of ratings of
the idea (or completed story) as original, creative, novel, clever, ingenious, and insightful.
Additionally, a variable assessing the degree to which participants felt their idea (or the
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completed story) was organic was computed using the summation of three self-rated
items describing the degree to which the idea was organic, natural, and authentic.
Inspiration. A three-item measure of inspiration was completed twice after the
story writing task: once to assess inspiration at the moment o f getting an idea and again to
assess inspiration while writing the story. Participants responded using a seven-point
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).
Effort. A three-item measure o f effort was completed twice after the story writing
task: once to assess effort in getting an idea for the story and again to assess effort while
writing the story. Participants responded using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly
disagree, 7 = strongly agree).
Attributions o f idea and story origins. A six-item scale was completed twice after
the story completion task: once to assess the role of three possible origins o f the idea, and
again to assess the role o f those three origins in the writing process. Each origin was
composed of two items: conscious sources (conscious mind, unconscious thought),
unconscious sources (unconscious or subconscious mind, nonconscious source deep
within), or spiritual sources (supernatural or spiritual force, spiritual or transcendent
influence). Participants responded using an identical seven-point Likert scale previously
described.
Demographic Information. Standard demographic information was collected
including sex, age, and ethnicity. Self-reports o f verbal and math scores for the
Standardized Aptitude Test (SAT) were collected as an assessment verbal ability.
Participants also indicated whether or not English was their first language learned and
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primary language o f use, and rated the perceived difficulty o f the writing task and
whether or not they produced a complete story.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Preliminary analysis revealed no significant main effects of sex or significant
interactions between sex and condition (see Table 1).
Manipulation check. No significant effects were found using a regression to test
whether or not condition predicted either attributions o f story ideas to unconscious
sources (see Table 2). This preliminary result suggests that the manipulation may have
been unsuccessful. Thus, the following analyses involving the manipulation must be
interpreted with caution given the failed manipulation check.
Condition effects
Three condition contrasts were used to perform regression analyses to assess the
effect o f the manipulation on the creativity task: control condition versus all other
conditions, unconscious thought conditions (1- and 2-back) versus conscious thought
condition, and 2-back condition versus 1-back condition. Regression analyses revealed no
significant relationship between condition and a self-rating o f creativity o f the completed
story (see Table 3). Additionally, there was no significant relationship between condition
and a self-rating o f the creativity of the story idea (see Table 4). No significant
relationship was found between condition and inspiration either when getting an idea for
the story (see Table 5) or writing the story (see Table 6). Thus, the hypothesis that
unconscious thought conditions would produce more feelings o f inspiration and higher
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self-ratings of creativity was not supported. This finding led to more in-depth exploratory
probing to investigate the reasons for the failure of the experimental manipulation.
Exploratory analyses
Affect and Idea Appraisal. Three identical condition contrasts were used to
perform regression analyses to investigate the lack of effect o f manipulation on the
creativity task. Regression results revealed two significant effects o f condition. First, the
contrast o f experimental conditions versus control condition significantly predicted lower
ratings o f positive affect at the moment of getting an idea, P = -.22, p < 0.05. This finding
indicates that the control condition had higher ratings o f positive affect (M = 29.42)
relative to the conscious thought condition (M = 26.69), the 1-back condition (M=24.45),
and the 2-back condition (M = 24.35; see Figure 1). Second, an identical contrast showed
a significant difference in appraisal o f the idea as organic as a result o f manipulation
conditions versus controls, P = -.21 ,p < 0.05. Again, this indicates that the control
condition had a higher mean self-rating o f the idea as organic (M = 13.06) versus the
conscious thought condition (M ~ 11.66), the 2-back condition (M = 11.55), and the 1back condition (M =10.78; see Figure 2).
Personality Traits. Regression analyses using identical contrasts described above
were performed to test moderating effects of NEO-FFI personality traits on the
relationship between creativity and unconscious thought and inspiration and unconscious
thought, respectively. The contrast o f all experimental conditions versus the control
condition revealed a significant interaction effect with NEO-FFI Neuroticism, such that
those high on neuroticism were especially responsive to the conscious thought, 1-back,
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and 2-back conditions when rating inspiration at the moment o f getting the idea for their
story, p = -.19,/? < 0.05.
Using the regression formula, predicted values based on high and low self-rated
NEO-FFI neuroticism were calculated for self-rated inspiration at the moment of getting
an idea for each experimental condition. Individuals high in neuroticism tended to report
lower mean ratings o f inspiration in the 1-back (M = 10.21), the conscious thought (M =
8.95), and the 2-back (M = 8.38) conditions than in the control condition (M = 12.12).
Individuals low in neuroticism report similar ratings o f inspiration across the conscious
thought (M = 11.75), 2-back (M = 11.44), 1-back (M = 9.28), and in the control
condition (M = 10.04; see Figure 3).
Perceived Competence. Regression analyses were performed to determine
whether perceived competence and experience in writing in general and fictional writing
moderated self-ratings o f creativity and inspiration. Although neither self-ratings of
c. competence or experience in writing significantly predicted self-ratings o f creativity or
inspiration, a pattern approaching significance was found for the influence o f an
interaction o f an unconscious versus conscious condition contrast and perceived
competence at writing on a self-rating of creativity of the completed story, p - 0.16,/? =
0.08.
Using the regression formula, predicted values for high and low perceived writing
competence were calculated for each experimental condition. The control condition
produced the highest self-ratings o f creativity in high and low competence individuals. In
those participants with high self-rated competence, creativity ratings for the 1-back
(21.25) and 2-back (22.76) conditions were higher than that o f the conscious thought
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condition (19.76) (see Figure 4). A different pattern was observed for participants with
low self-rated writing competence, such that creativity ratings were highest in the
conscious thought condition (19.92) relative to the 1-back (17.76) and 2-back (15.65)
conditions (see Figure 4).
Expert Ratings o f Creativity
Past research has shown that self-ratings o f creativity are more highly correlated
with ratings of inspiration and unconscious attributions than are peer-ratings (Thrash &
Cassidy, in preparation). Additionally, self-reports consistently predict peer reports of
creativity. Because preliminary analyses showed no effect o f manipulation on self-ratings
of creativity and inspiration, I determined that peer ratings o f creativity were even less
likely to support the hypotheses than self-ratings. Additionally, accurate coding of
completed stories would necessitate the employment o f English majors as qualified
coders. Given the limited budgeting resources for this study, expert ratings of creativity
were not collected.
Attributions o f Idea to Unconscious Thought
Although the experimental conditions used in this study were not effective in
manipulating conscious and unconscious thought, the mediational model could still be
tested using the measured attribution of the source of the main story idea in place of
condition. Following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) three steps for establishing a mediational
model, a series o f two regressions was performed to assess whether inspiration mediated
the relationship between attributions o f idea to unconscious sources and appraisal of the
idea as creative. Each analysis includes all three condition contrast codes in order to
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control for the effects o f experimental condition, which are not relevant for this particular
analysis.
In the first step, I entered the three contrast codes (any experimental condition vs.
control, unconscious thought conditions vs. conscious thought condition, and 1-back
condition vs. 2-back condition) and attribution o f story idea to an unconscious source as
predictors o f the self-appraisal of creativity. Attribution o f idea to an unconscious source
was the only significant predictor o f self-rated creativity of the completed story, p = 0.29,
p < 0.001. Next, inspiration at the moment of getting a story idea was used as an outcome
variable, with the three contrast codes and attribution o f idea to unconscious sources
again used as predictors. Attribution o f story idea to unconscious sources was the only
significant predictor of inspiration at the moment of getting a story idea, p = 0.30, p <
0.001. In the second step, inspiration at the moment o f getting an idea was included in
addition to all variables from step one as predictors of the self-appraisal o f creativity.
Inspiration at the moment of getting an idea was the only significant predictor o f selfrated creativity o f the completed story, p = 0.51, p < 0.001. Additionally, when
inspiration was added as a predictor o f self-rated creativity, the relationship between
attributions of idea to unconscious sources and self-rated creativity was no longer
significant, p = 0.12, n.s (see Figure 5). These findings lend compelling support to the
mediational model o f creativity proposed in the current study.
Discussion
The hypothesis that unconscious thought would produce increased self-ratings of
creativity and inspiration was not supported by the results o f analyses based on
experimental condition. A contrast comparing all manipulation conditions (1-back, 2-
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back, and conscious thought) to the control condition (immediate completion) revealed
significantly lower positive affect and ratings o f the idea as organic in all manipulation
conditions relative to the control condition. More specifically, participants in the control
condition reported the highest positive affect and participants in the unconscious thought
conditions reported the lowest positive affect. Additionally, NEO-FFI Neuroticism scores
interacted with condition such that higher neuroticism lowered inspiration at the time of
generating a story idea for those in the 2-back and conscious thought conditions. Neither
self-rated competence nor experience in writing predicted self-rated creativity,
inspiration, or decreased effort. A pattern approaching significance was observed for the
influence o f the interaction o f perceived competence in writing and an unconscious vs.
conscious thought contrast on self-ratings of creativity o f stories. In contrast, exploratory
analyses provided support for the meditational model when controlling for the effects of
condition, such that attributions o f the idea to unconscious sources significantly predicted
inspiration, which significantly predicted self-rated creativity.
Significant changes in positive affect as a result o f condition
Positive affect correlates highly with both self-ratings o f creativity and
inspiration. Frederickson and Branigan (2005) compared primed positive and negative
emotion states to neutral emotion states. They found that positive emotions broadened the
scope o f attention to encompass a global focus whereas negative emotion states narrowed
the focus of attention. Further, they found that negative emotion states narrow attention
toward specific action tendencies (i.e. run away in fear, attack in anger) and the
mobilization o f the appropriate physical response. Conversely, positive emotional states
broaden activation of action tendencies, producing significantly more action tendencies
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than either negative or neutral emotion states, suggesting a corresponding broadening of
cognitive processes, most specifically associations between thought and action.
The pattern o f results observed in analysis of positive affect and condition
supports Frederickson’s (2001) broaden and build theory, which states that the differing
effects of emotional states on attention is an evolved complementary function. Negative
emotions narrow attentional focus to specific action tendencies because they more closely
correspond with active threats in the environment whereas positive emotions broaden
thought-action repertoires, inspiring individuals to pursue a broader range o f thoughts,
actions, and associations than they would in either neutral or negative states
(Frederickson, 2001). Positive emotions may further serve to build up personal resources
over time, in effect creating positive psychological conditions that outlast the emotional
states in which they were developed. More specifically, it may increase resources such as
physical health, social resources, intellectual resources, and may foster certain
psychological processes, most notably creativity (Frederickson, 2001).
Thus, significantly lower ratings o f positive affect in unconscious thought
conditions and conscious thought conditions relative to the control condition is a likely
explanation o f the failure o f the manipulation conditions. These results suggest that any
condition in which participants were asked to wait a period o f time before expressing
their ideas had a negative effect on the subsequent writing task and self-ratings of
positive affect. There are multiple explanations for this effect. First, perhaps requiring
participants to wait to express their idea, either by conscious planning or by distracting
them from thought, frustrated them enough to negatively influence positive affect.
Indeed, the corresponding low self-attributions of the idea as organic in manipulation
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conditions could be the result o f a similar process. Restricting the flow o f the creative
process in a contrived laboratory setting may have decreased the feeling that ideas
originated from a natural source. The disruption caused by the forced delay o f idea
expression could account for both findings.
Second, the distraction task used in the unconscious thought conditions could
have been the source o f additional differences in positive affect between unconscious and
conscious thought conditions. We included both the 1-back and 2-back tasks in an effort
to assess different levels o f potential cognitive stress and frustration due to the
challenging nature o f the tasks. Indeed, results support the idea o f differing effects o f the
two n-back tasks. Although not significant, self-ratings o f positive affect were slightly
lower in the 2-back task compared to the 1-back task. Interestingly, the decrease in
positive affect in the conscious thought condition was less than the decrease in positive
affect seen in the unconscious thought conditions, relative to controls. These results could
indicate increasing decrements in positive affect, and increasing levels o f frustration, as a
result o f increasingly difficult and cognitively taxing tasks.
Significant interaction o f NEO-FFI Neuroticism and condition moderates self-rated
inspiration
The significant interaction o f neuroticism and manipulation conditions on selfratings of inspiration has interesting implications for the effects o f personality traits on
state-level inspiration. Participants with high neuroticism reported less inspiration in both
the conscious thought and 2-back conditions, suggesting that both highly focused thought
and highly taxing tasks will negatively impact the ability of highly neurotic individuals to
become inspired. In contrast, those participants reporting low neuroticism displayed
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equally high ratings o f inspiration at the moment of getting an idea in both the conscious
thought and 2-back conditions, suggesting some benefit for both focused thought and
unconscious thought during distraction. Additionally, the magnitude o f difference
between high and low neuroticism participants was greatest in the 2-back condition (see
Figure 5). Neuroticism has been linked to simplistic thinking styles, high adherence to
norms, and low self-awareness (Zhang & Huang, 2001). To the extent that inspiration
necessitates an awareness of one’s own internal states, and to the extent that creativity
requires departure from norms and complex cognitions, neuroticism could be a negative
influence on both. Future research should continue to investigate the effects of
personality traits on state-level inspiration, affect, and creativity.
Interaction o f self-rated competence and condition moderates self-rated creativity.
Self-ratings o f writing competence interacted with condition to moderate the
relationship between unconscious thought and self-ratings o f inspiration, a result that was
marginally significant. In the control condition, those participants rating themselves as
highly competent at writing also produced higher predicted self-ratings o f creativity of
their completed stories. Participants in the conscious thought condition produced virtually
identical self-ratings o f creativity regardless of self-rated writing competence. Highly
competent writers again produced higher self-ratings o f creativity in both the 1- and 2back tasks, an effect that increased in magnitude from 1- to 2-back condition. This pattern
of results shows that, for those individuals who have self-perceived competence in
writing, the pattern predicted both by Dijksterhuis and colleagues’ (2006) previous
research and by the mediational model of creativity proposed does occur. Conversely,
unconscious thought exerted progressively negative effects on the self-rated creativity of
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individuals with low writing competence. These results suggest an important role for
perceived competence in moderating the benefits of unconscious thought on creativity.
Indeed, extensive research has shown that individuals with high perceived
competence are more likely to accept the challenges o f tasks and exhibit persistent effort
to complete tasks, generally leading to increased performance relative to low perceived
competence individuals (Elliot & Dweck, 1988; Leondari & Gialamas, 2002). On the
other hand, those with low perceived competence generally perform worse on tasks
relative to high competence individuals, and additionally show higher levels o f negative
affect and lower levels o f persistence during task completion (Elliot & Dweck, 1988). It
is possible that individuals with high self-perceived writing competence have more
experience with writing. More specifically, they may have higher competence as a direct
result of more experience which may have allowed them to engage in more frequent
incubation. Thus, they may be more used to engaging in unconscious thought during the
writing process. As a consequence, these individuals may benefit more from unconscious
thought as a function o f being better at unconscious thought because o f increased levels
of practice.
Although results indicate that the manipulation used here was not effective, there
was strong support for the proposed mediational model independent of conditions.
Attributions of the idea to unconscious sources strongly predicted self-ratings o f the
creativity of the main story idea. When self-rated inspiration was taken into
consideration, it was strongly predicted by attributions o f idea to unconscious sources and
in turn strongly predicted creativity o f the story idea, after which the relationship between
attributions of the idea to unconscious sources and creativity was no longer significant
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(see Figure 5). This pattern o f results strongly suggests that the processes posited by the
current model did indeed occur within individuals, and provides more evidence that the
primary problem with the current study was a failure of the experimental manipulation
and not an absence o f the effect itself
Although many explanations exist regarding the failure o f the unconscious and
conscious thought manipulations in the current study, the existence o f the phenomenon
characterized by Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2006) and proposed here in the mediational
model was supported by subsequent analyses. Interestingly, the pattern o f expected
results predicted by the proposed model was found when the experimental manipulation
was controlled for. This pattern provides a strong foundation for future study of the
relationship between unconscious thought processes, inspiration, and creativity. It is
possible that using a different distraction task, thereby minimizing decreases in positive
affect, may be sufficient to show the desired effect. Future research should labor to
identify more suitable ways to effectively manipulate conscious and unconscious thought.
The mediated model proposed here, if validated in the future, would be an important and
meaningful progression in our understanding o f the processes driving human innovation.

Appendix A: Full description o f n-back tasks as viewed by participants
In the 1-back task, you will be presented with a series o f one-digit numbers, one at a time.
After seeing each number, you will be asked whether it matches the number that came
before it. For example, imagine that you are shown the following sequence o f numbers,
one at a time: 4, 4, 6, 5, 3, 3, 7, 9, 7. After being shown the second number (4), you
would be asked whether it matches the number that preceded it (4). The correct answer
would be "Match," because 4 matches 4. Then, after being shown the third number (6),
the correct answer would be "No Match," because the 6 doesn't match the 4 that preceded
it. In this example, the correct answer for all remaining numbers would be "No Match,"
except for the sixth number (3), which matches the 3 that preceded it. Please press
"Continue” to try a practice 1-back task.
The 2-back task works exactly like the 1-back task with one key difference: for each
number, you will indicate whether it matches the number that came TWO before it. For
example, imagine that you are shown the following sequence o f numbers, one at a time:
4, 6, 4, 5, 3, 8, 7, 9, 7. After being shown the third number (4), you would be asked
whether it matches the number that came two before it (4). The correct answer would be
"Match," because 4 matches 4. Then, after being shown the next number (5), the correct
answer would be "No Match," because the 5 doesn't match the 6 that came two before it.
In this example, the correct answer for all remaining numbers would be "No Match,"
except for the final number (7), which matches the 7 that came two before it. Please press
"Continue" to try a practice 2-back task.
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Appendix 2: Beginning o f story task as viewed by participants
John and Maria walked through town on a summer evening, hand in hand. It was their
third date. As they were passing a house next to the lake, they stopped, alarmed by a
sound coming from inside the house. Immediately they knew that the evening had taken a
turn in a direction that they could not have anticipated.
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Table 1
Moderation o f s e lf ratings o f inspiration and creativity by sex and interaction o f sex and
condition.

P

t

P

Inspiration while writing
sex

-0.10

-1.07

0.29

sex X contrast 1

-0.20

-0.70

0.49

sex X contrast 2

0.41

1.40

0.16

sex X contrast 3

-0.50

-1.64

0.10

Inspiration at the moment o f getting an idea
sex

-0.08

-0.90

0.37

sex X contrast 1

-0.18

-0.62

0.54

sex X contrast 2

0.33

1.10

0.27

sex X contrast 3

-0.29

-0.95

0.35

Six-item rating o f creativity o f completed story
sex

-0.15

-1.64

0.10

sex X contrast 1

0.01

0.04

0.97

sex X contrast 2

0.21

0.71

0.48

sex X contrast 3
-0.31
-1.02
0.31
Note: sex = main effect o f sex; contrast 1 = interaction o f sex and condition contrast of
any experimental condition vs. control condition; contrast 2 = interaction o f sex and
condition contrast of unconscious thought conditions (1- and 2-back) vs. conscious
thought condition; contrast 3 = interaction of sex and condition contrast o f 2-back
condition vs. 1-back condition.
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Table 2
Condition contrasts predicting attributions o f story idea to unconscious sources
t
P

P

Contrast 1

-0.00

-0.04

0.97

Contrast 2

-0.04

-0.40

0.69

-0.05
-0.51
0.61
Contrast 3
Note: contrast 1 = any experimental condition vs. control condition; contrast 2 =
unconscious thought conditions (1-back and 2-back) vs. conscious thought condition;
contrast 3 = 2-back condition vs. 1-back condition.
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Table 3

P

t

P

Contrast 1

-0.10

-1.09

0.28

Contrast 2

-0.03

-0.32

0.75

Contrast 3
-0.02
-0.20
0.84
Note: contrast 1 = any experimental condition vs. control condition; contrast 2 =
unconscious thought conditions (1-back and 2-back) vs. conscious thought condition;
contrast 3 = 2-back condition vs. 1-back condition.
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Table 4
Conditional contrasts predicting a six-item self-rating o f creativity o f story idea
t
P

P

Contrast 1

-0.08

-0.92

0.33

Contrast 2

-0.06

-0.66

0.51

Contrast 3
-0.01
-0.11
Note: contrast 1 = any experimental condition vs. control condition; contrast 2 =

0.91

unconscious thought conditions (1-back and 2-back) vs. conscious thought condition;
contrast 3 = 2-back condition vs. 1-back condition.
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Table 5
Condition contrasts predicting inspiration at the moment o f getting story idea
t
P

P

Contrast 1

-0.10

-1.10

0.27

Contrast 2

-0.08

-0.91

0.37

-0.21
-0.02
Contrast 3
Note: contrast 1 = any experimental condition vs. control condition; contrast 2 =

0.84

unconscious thought conditions (1-back and 2-back) vs. conscious thought condition;
contrast 3 = 2-back condition vs. 1-back condition.
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Table 6
Condition contrasts predicting self-ratings o f inspiration while writing

P

t

P

Contrast 1

-0.12

-1.32

0.19

Contrast 2

-0.08

-0.91

0.37

Contrast 3
0.02
0.21
Note: contrast 1 = any experimental condition vs. control condition; contrast 2 =

0.83

unconscious thought conditions (1-back and 2-back) vs. conscious thought condition;
contrast 3 = 2-back condition vs. 1-back condition.
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Figure captions
Figure 1. Graph o f self-rated positive affect at the moment o f getting an idea for the story
as a function o f condition.
Figure 2. Graph of self-rated appraisal o f the story idea as organic as a function o f
condition.
Figure 3. Graph o f predicted values for self-appraisal o f story idea as creative as a
function of the interaction between NEO-FFI neuroticism and condition.
Figure 4. Graph o f predicted values for self-rated inspiration at the moment of getting an
idea for the story as a function of the interaction between self-rated competence and
condition.
Figure 5. Steps 1 and 2 for establishing the mediation o f the relationship between
attributions of story idea to unconscious sources and creativity by inspiration.
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Step 1

Unconscious
Thought

p=0.29**

Creativity

Step 2

Inspiration

Unconscious
Thought

p=0.12 n.s.

Creativity

Note: ** = significant at the 0.001 level; *** = significant at the 0.0001 level
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